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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since publication of the last Commercial Transaction Survey in 2012, almost two 
hundred cases have been decided by state and federal courts under the Texas 
version of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 A majority of these cases confirmed 
prior interpretations of the Code, but several involved issues not previously 
addressed in Texas or that remain unsettled at the state or national level. 
Although several cases in the former category are briefly noted, this article 
concentrates on decisions in the latter group. 
II.  DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A.  CONSPICUOUSNESS & FAIR NOTICE 
Several years ago, in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc.,2 the Texas 
Supreme Court held that the Code definition should be applied in both Code 
and non-Code cases to determine whether a relevant clause or notice meets the 
standard of “conspicuous.”3 A few years later, in Littlefield v. Schaefer,4 the court 
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 1. The Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code appears as the first nine chapters in 
the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the “Code”). See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 
1.101–9.809 (West 2009). The Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966 as a separate 
statute. See 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 721, at 1–316. It was reenacted in 1967 as part of the 
Business & Commerce Code, the first of the codes promulgated under the Texas Codification Act. 
In that process, the designation of “Article” in the Official Text was changed to “Chapter,” 
subsections were designated by letters rather than numbers, and a period instead of a dash was used 
to designate sections. Thus, for example, § 2-204(1) in the Official Text became § 2.204(a) in the 
Texas codification. Revisions of the Code that have taken place since 1967 still substitute 
“Chapter” for “Article,” and still use a period instead of a dash, but now use the Official Text 
system for designating subsections. See, e.g., the revised version of Chapter 3 of the Code, 1995 Tex. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 921, § 1, which became effective on January 1, 1996. As currently enacted, Chapter 
2 is the only chapter of the Code that retains the older non-uniform system to designate 
subsections. In the grand scheme of things, this is a minor point, but it can be confusing when 
doing Code research and in correlating the text of the Official Comments (which have not been 
adopted in Texas as part of the Code itself) to the statutory provisions. It can also affect searching 
on WestLaw and LEXIS if the searcher is trying to track case interpretations of particular sections 
of the Code due to the variation in section and subsection designations over the years.  
 2. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. 1993). 
 3. “Conspicuous” is defined in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(10) (West 2009), 
which provides: 
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expanded the fair notice requirements of “risk-shifting clauses,” such as waivers, 
releases, and indemnity provisions, by holding that such provisions must not 
only be conspicuous, but must also clearly state the intent of a party to be 
released from liability.5 These requirements have since been applied in 
numerous cases, including several decided since publication of the last Survey.6 
While these cases were merely routine applications of the Dresser and Littlefield 
standards, the decision in Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC7 stands out because 
it addressed an unsettled issue about the effectiveness of risk-shifting provisions 
beyond the ordinary situation. In Van Voris, the court held that a release and 
waiver-of-liability agreement signed by a customer who enrolled in a martial arts 
course was both conspicuous and effective to waive a right to sue for injuries 
caused by the alleged negligence of the instructor during a jiu-jitsu 
demonstration.8 However, the customer also alleged that his injuries were 
caused not merely by negligence but by gross negligence.9 On this issue, the 
court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had not directly addressed the 
relationship between pre-injury releases of liability for gross negligence and 
public policy concerns about risk-shifting claims that may result in an award of 
punitive damages.10 After reviewing several cases discussing the role of public 
policy in other contexts, particularly in connection with insurance, the court 
reasoned that a “strong public policy prohibiting extraordinary risk-shifting 
provisions absent fair notice” required a clear statement of intent to release 
claims of gross negligence.11 While the release in question met the requirement 
that it be conspicuous, it did not mention gross negligence as one of the claims 
 
“Conspicuous,” with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented 
that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. 
Whether a term is “conspicuous” or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous 
terms include the following: (A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than 
the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of 
the same or lesser size; and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger 
type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the 
surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size 
by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language. 
 4. Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. 1997). 
 5. In Littlefield, the court stated, “First, a party’s intent to be released from all liability must be 
expressed in unambiguous terms within the four corners of the contract. . . . Second, the clause 
must be ‘conspicuous’ under the objective standard defined in the Uniform Commercial Code.” Id. 
at 274. 
 6. See, e.g., Butler v. Taser Inter., Inc., 2012 WL 3867105 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 6, 2012) (waiver 
of the right to sue for injuries resulting from a Taser gun demonstration during training class held 
effective); Thom v. Rebel’s Honky Tonk, 2013 WL 1748798 (Tex. App.—Austin, Apr. 17, 2013, no 
pet.) (mem. op.) (substituted for earlier opinion) (holding a release and assumption of risk 
agreement precluded recovery for injuries suffered in a fall from riding a mechanical bull in an 
Austin bar); Tutle & Tutle Trucking, Inc. v. EOG Res., Inc., 391 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.—Waco 
2012, pet. dism’d) (finding an indemnity provision both conspicuous and effective to absolve 
trucking company from duty to defend action brought by company employee against customer of 
company). 
 7. Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC, 402 S.W.3d 915, 918–24 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, 
no pet.). 
 8. Id. at 920–21. 
 9. Id. at 921. 
 10. Id. at 921–22. 
 11. Id. at 924–26. 
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being released and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirement of fair notice.12 
Summary judgment in favor of the martial arts center on this issue was reversed 
and the case remanded.13 
B.  INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT TERMS 
One of the most critical issues in contract law is interpretation of the terms 
used by parties in their agreement. Section 1.303 of the Code allows evidence of 
course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage to be used as aids to 
interpretation unless such evidence directly conflicts with the express terms of 
an agreement.14 Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Odfjell Seachem is one of the relatively 
few cases arising in Texas involving the application of the United Nations 
Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).15 In Citgo, a buyer in 
the United States contracted to buy several tons of a chemical from a seller in 
Argentina. The contract provided that the goods were to be shipped “CFR.” 
Because this was an international sale of goods, the court determined that it was 
governed by the CISG, and incorporated the International Chamber of 
Commerce definition of the CFR term, meaning “Cost and Freight.”16 Because 
both parties were engaged in the international sale and purchase of chemicals, 
the court held that the seller knew or should have known that the CFR term 
requires a seller to select a proper vessel and bear the risk of loss or damage until 
the goods are loaded onboard.17 
Although the seller loaded the goods on a vessel in compliance with the CFR 
term, a problem arose when the ship broke down en-route because of a pre-
 
 12. Id. at 926. 
 13. Id. 
 14. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.303(d–e) (West 2009). “Course of performance” refers 
to how parties have acted under their current agreement. For example, if the agreement calls for 
deliveries on the first of each month, but deliveries are routinely made and accepted a few days late, 
this may prevent a buyer from suddenly rejecting a delivery for failure to deliver on the first. The 
behavior of the parties has indicated they have interpreted their agreement to mean deliveries “on 
or about” the first, that they have effectively modified their agreement to permit later delivery, or 
that the buyer has waived the right to reject because of a delay. “Course of dealing” refers to how 
the parties have dealt with each other under previous contracts of the same kind. As with course of 
performance, a party may be barred from acting under a current contract in a manner different 
from the way a party acted under similar previous contracts. “Usage of trade” refers to the way in 
which parties in a particular trade or industry routinely interpret contract terms used in that trade 
or industry (e.g., a contract for the sale of “2x4” lumber would probably not allow a buyer to reject a 
delivery of lumber that physically measures 1-5/8” by 3-5/8” because that is the standard dimension 
of 2x4 lumber). Careful drafting of express terms in a contract can, however, override use of these 
aids to interpretation. For example, an anti-waiver clause may allow a buyer to reject a delayed 
delivery even if past deliveries have been accepted despite the delay or a contract may specifically 
require lumber of a certain physical dimension by excluding evidence of contrary trade usage. For a 
recent decision rejecting evidence of course of dealing and course of performance as being 
insufficient to vary the ordinary meaning of a term used in a contract, see Shell Trading (US) Co. v. 
Lion Oil Trading and Trans., Inc., No. 14-11-00289-CV, 2012 WL 3958029 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] Sept. 11, 2012, pet. denied) (finding evidence of two prior occurrences years earlier 
under the circumstances caused by Hurricane Katrina did not establish a course of dealing to vary 
the meaning of a contract term, and single performance under a single contract did not establish a 
course of performance). 
 15. Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Odfjell Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 2013 WL 2289951, at *1, *5 
(S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (setting forth the facts of the case). 
 16. Id. at *5. 
 17. Id. 
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existing engine problem, causing delivery to the buyer to be delayed for almost 
two months.18 The buyer sued for breach of contract but the seller contended 
that its obligation ended when the goods were loaded on the ship. The buyer 
argued that article 32 of the CISG also imposes a duty on the seller to select an 
appropriate vessel, which this seller did not do. On this issue, the court found 
that article 32 obligated the seller to select an appropriate means of 
transportation and a fact issue existed on whether the seller had done so.19 
Because of this fact issue, the seller’s motion for summary judgment was 
denied.20 
C.  GOOD FAITH & FAIR DEALING 
In Mailing and Shipping Systems, Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., the court addressed 
the question of whether a duty of good faith and fair dealing under § 1.304 of 
the Code required a supplier to provide a ninety-day notice of termination to a 
dealer where there was a conflict between the ninety-day time period stated in 
the Dealer’s Policy Manual and a thirty-day time period contained in the 
dealership agreement.21 The court reasoned that the Policy Manual and the 
dealership agreement should be read together and, in light of a clause in the 
Policy Manual stating that it governed the relationship “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in a written agreement with the Dealer,” the shorter time period was 
controlling.22 The court rejected an argument that the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing imposed any obligation greater than that stated in the dealership 
agreement.23 The court noted that under Texas law, there is no independent 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, but, rather, the duty only requires a party to 
comply with the obligations created by the contract itself.24 
D.  ACCELERATION 
Acceleration of payment or performance obligations is referred to in several 
sections of the Code.25 The right to accelerate, however, has been carefully 
circumscribed by judicial imposition of a series of notice requirements that must 
be met or effectively waived before acceleration is effective.26 While the 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at *8. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Mailing & Shipping Sys., Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 879, 885 (W.D. Tex. 
2013). 
 22. Id. at 885–86. 
 23. Id. at 889. 
 24. Id. On this point, the court cited an important decision in Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Conoco, 
Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1998), where the court held that there was no independent duty of 
good faith and fair dealing but, rather, the duty was a way of measuring a party’s performance 
under the contract terms. 
 25. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.309, 2A.109, 3.106(b), .108(b), .118(a), .304(b), 
.304(c) (West 2009). 
 26. In Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233–34 (Tex. 1982), the court held that 
proper acceleration requires a three step process: notice of intent to accelerate, notice of 
acceleration, and presentment. In Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 
1991), the court later held that these requirements could be waived if the waiver separately stated 
and expressly waived each of these requirements. 
2014] Commercial Transactions 105 
requirements are clear, problems can arise if a waiver is poorly drafted or, as 
illustrated by the decision in Mathis v. DCR Mortgage III Sub I, L.L.C.,27 if loan 
documents are not consistent in their statement of waiver. In Mathis, the court 
determined that the waiver clause in a note, standing alone, would have been 
effective.28 Unfortunately for the creditor, however, the deed of trust securing 
the note did not contain a waiver that “clearly and unequivocally” waived the 
notice requirements.29 The court held that the note and deed of trust, read 
together, did not waive the right to proper notice, and the attempted 
acceleration was therefore ineffective.30 This case is of particular interest because 
the court pointed out that if the deed of trust had said nothing about waiver, 
the waiver provision in the note would have been effective.31 The lesson to be 
learned from Mathis is that too much drafting can sometimes be as bad as too 
little drafting.32 
In APM Enterprises, LLC v. National Loan Acquisitions, Co., a note holder sent 
notices to the maker demanding payment of past due amounts and stating that 
if the payments were not made, the loan would be referred to an attorney for 
collection.33 The court held that these notices were not sufficient to state an 
intent to accelerate as required by Texas law.34 Summary judgment in favor of 
the note holder was reversed and the case remanded.35 
III.  SALE OF GOODS 
A.  THE CODE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 2.201 states the Statute of Frauds requirements in contracts for the 
sale of goods.36 The basic rule requires a writing signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought for contracts in the amount of five hundred 
dollars or more.37 A corollary to this rule is that a party who has not signed a 
 
 27. Mathis v. DCR Mortgage III Sub I, L.L.C., 389 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no 
pet.). 
 28. Id. at 507. 
 29. Id. at 507–08. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 507. 
 32. The problem with excess drafting is somewhat reminiscent of what Mark Twain said about 
talks that last too long. See http://www.twainquotes.com/Impulse.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
It is interesting to note that the drafting problem involved in Mathis seems to have been rarely 
litigated since the only case in point cited and discussed extensively in the opinion was an 
unpublished decision decided some fifteen years earlier. See Dolci v. Askew, No. 04-95-00867-CV, 
1997 WL 428560 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, July 30, 1997) (not designated for publication). In light 
of the numerous foreclosure cases arising in recent years, Mathis may provide another basis to 
challenge the effectiveness of a foreclosure if proper notice is not given or if inconsistent waiver 
language exists in the note and deed of trust. The same could also be true if waiver language in a 
note differs from that contained in an underlying security agreement in a personal property 
transaction under Chapter 9 of the Code. 
 33. APM Enterprises, LLC v. Nat’l Loan Acquisitions, Co., 357 S.W.3d 405, 406 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2012, no pet.). 
 34. Id. at 409. 
 35. Id. 
 36. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.101 (West 2009). 
 37. Id. 
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written contract may still be bound if that party receives a confirmation from the 
other party but fails to object to the confirmation within ten days after it has 
been received.38 The only required term that the writing or the confirmation 
must contain is a statement of quantity.39 Once such a document is shown to 
exist, a party is entitled to proceed with oral testimony to prove other terms of 
the agreement. This basic rule and its corollary were directly involved in Westlake 
Petrochemicals, L.L.C. v. United Polychem, Inc., where a seller entered into an 
agreement to sell ethylene to a buyer.40 When the price of ethylene fell, the 
buyer refused to proceed, claiming that a final contract had not been formed 
because there was no writing to reflect the understanding of the parties about 
the need for the seller to approve the buyer’s credit as part of the contract. The 
buyer argued that the credit term was essential to the contract and neither an 
instant message nor an email sent by the seller to the buyer reflected this term. 
The court held that the instant message and the email to confirm the sale were 
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds because the message and email stated 
the quantity of ethylene to be sold, the only term required by § 2.201.41 As to 
the credit term, the court determined that approval of credit was a condition 
precedent to the seller’s performance and not a condition precedent to 
formation of a contract.42 
Another sale of goods issue in Westlake concerned the measure of damages 
that the seller was entitled to recover.43 The trial court instructed the jury to 
determine an award of damages under § 2.708(a) of the Code, which is based on 
the standard contract formula of assessing damages based on the difference 
between the contract price and the market price.44 Based on this instruction, the 
jury returned a verdict in the amount of $6.3 million in favor of the seller and 
this amount was incorporated in the final judgment of the trial court.45 On 
appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether use of the 2.708(a) formula 
overcompensated the seller because, after learning of the buyer’s breach, the 
seller did not actually purchase ethylene from its own suppliers.46 Referring to 
its earlier decision in Nobs Chemical, USA v. Koppers, Co.,47 the court reasoned 
 
 38. This provision of the Statute of Frauds is generally referred to as the “merchant’s 
exception” because it is only applicable to contracts between merchants. See TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (West 2009). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Westlake Petrochemicals, L.L.C. v. United Polychem, Inc., 688 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 
2012) (setting forth facts and claims of the parties). 
 41. Id. at 241. 
 42. Id. at 242. 
 43. Id. 
 44. TEX. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(a) (West 2009) provides: 
(1) Subject to subsection (b) and to the provisions of this chapter with respect to 
proof of market price (Section 2.723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or 
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and 
place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages 
provided in this chapter (Section 2.710), less expenses saved in consequence of the 
buyer’s breach. 
 45. Westlake, 688 F.3d at 243. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Nobs Chemical, USA v. Koppers, Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980). In 1 JAMES J. WHITE 
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 715–16 
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that in the case of breach, both the Code and general contract law are intended 
to award expectation damages that put a party in the same position the party 
would have been in if the contract had been performed.48 Because an award 
under § 2.708(a) would put the seller in a better position than performance 
would have done, it was more appropriate to award the seller the lost profit 
measure of damages under § 2.708(b).49 The case was remanded for a new trial 
on the issue of damages that should be allowed under § 2.708(b).50 
B.  BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT? 
One of the most perplexing issues in Texas law governing the sale of goods 
under Chapter 2 of the Code is when a claim may be asserted for breach of 
either contract or warranty. Part of the reason for this complexity lies in the 
inclusion of breach of warranty claims in the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act (DTPA).51 Under general Texas law, attorney’s fees are recoverable in a 
breach of contract action under the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code and 
in breach of warranty actions brought under the DTPA.52 However, under the 
DTPA, damage recovery may be multiplied if the conduct complained of was 
committed “knowingly” or “intentionally,” and may also result in additional 
recovery for mental anguish.53 The lure of recovering attorney fees and 
enhanced damages has resulted in a vast number of cases alleging violations of 
the DTPA for breach of warranty.54 In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP 
Corp., the court reviewed the historical development of warranty law and 
pointed out that “[t]he UCC recognizes that breach of contract and breach of 
warranty are not the same cause of action.”55 While this helped to clarify the 
 
(6th ed. 2010), Nobs is described as one of two “major cases” that properly applied TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (West 2009) when the contract/market formula in § 2.708(a) would 
overcompensate a plaintiff seller. 
 48. Westlake, 688 F.3d at 243–44 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.305(a) (West 
2009) and Little Darling Corp. v. Ald, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, no 
writ.)). 
 49. Id. at 244. 
 50. Id. at 247. 
 51. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act appears as Chapter 17 in the Business & 
Commerce Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–.63 (West 2009); TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (West 2009) (which provides, inter alia, that “[a] consumer may 
maintain an action . . . [for] breach of an express or implied warranty. . . .”). 
 52. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (West 2008) (“A person may recover 
reasonable attorney’s fees from an individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid 
claim and costs, if the claim is for . . . an oral or written contract.”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 17.50(d) (West 2009) (“Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court costs and reasonable 
and necessary attorneys’ fees.”). 
 53. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2009) (stating a formula for the 
recovery of economic damages and the multiplier when the trier of fact determines that conduct 
was committed knowingly or intentionally). 
 54. A rough measure of the number of cases can be determined by a Westlaw search using the 
phrase, “DTPA” & “breach of warranty” for cases decided after May 1, 1973, the effective date of 
the DTPA. As of January 22, 2015, this search found 1,154 cases in which both terms appeared. A 
detailed discussion of the relationship between the Code and the DTPA is beyond the scope of this 
Survey. Suffice it to say that other factors may lead a plaintiff to bring a claim under the DTPA, 
including differing statute of limitation provisions that may allow a DTPA claim to proceed even 
though it may be barred under the limitation provisions of the Code. 
 55. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. 1991). In 
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point that a breach of contract would not give rise to a breach of warranty under 
the DTPA, it did little to explain the difference. Some subsequent decisions 
interpreted Southwestern Bell as a determination that a breach of contract could 
only be asserted if a seller failed to deliver goods, but that a claim for breach of 
warranty would lie when goods have been delivered and accepted but the buyer 
later finds they are defective or non-conforming.56 A recent decision in Beauty 
Manufacturing Solutions Corp. v. Ashland, Inc. required the court to determine if 
delivery and acceptance of the wrong product without discovery of its non-
conformity until some of the product had been used in a manufacturing process 
was a breach of contract or a breach of warranty.57 As an initial matter, the court 
had to decide if the buyer had properly revoked acceptance of the goods. On 
this issue, the court held that revocation had not occurred because the condition 
of the goods had been changed in the manufacturing process.58 Nonetheless, the 
court also held that notice of the breach was timely under § 2.607(c) of the 
Code and that the plaintiff was not barred from seeking recovery.59 
Having resolved these matters, the court turned to the question of whether 
the buyer’s claim was one for breach of warranty or for breach of contract.60 On 
this issue, the court noted that § 2.714 of the Code provides remedies for both 
breach of warranty and breach of contract.61 The court further noted that the 
separation between these claims was “not entirely clear.”62 After reviewing earlier 
cases discussing the differences between these claims and the requirements for 
creation of a warranty, the court concluded that failure to deliver the product 
called for under the contract was “better understood as a breach of contract 
case” because the identifying product number was not a description of the 
quality or suitability of the goods.63 Once the claim was determined to be a 
breach of contract rather than a breach of warranty, the court had no difficulty 
in deciding that the plaintiff could not maintain a breach of warranty claim 
 
several other decisions, the court has stated that a “mere breach of contract” does not give rise to a 
DTPA violation. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 987 
S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. 1998); Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. 1996); La Sara 
Grain Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984); Ashford Devel., Inc. 
v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1983). 
 56. See, e.g., United Galvanizing, Inc. v. Imperial Zinc Corp., No. H-08-0551, 2011 WL 11185, 
at *9 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2011); Trident Steel Corp. v. Wiser Oil Co., 223 S.W.3d 520, 525–26 (Tex. 
App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. denied); Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 896–
97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., 930 
S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). 
 57. Beauty Mfg. Solutions Corp. v. Ashland, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665–67 (N.D. Tex. 
2012). 
 58. Id. at 669. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608(b) (West 2009) (requiring that 
“[r]evocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should 
have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not 
caused by their own defects”) (emphasis added). 
 59. Beauty Mfg. Solutions Corp., 848 F. Supp. 2d at 671. See TEX. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
2.607(c) (West 2009) (requiring that a buyer give notice of breach within a reasonable time after 
discovery or “be barred from any remedy”). 
 60. Beauty Mfg. Solutions Corp., 848 F. Supp. 2d at 671. 
 61. Id. at 668–69. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 671. 
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under the DTPA.64 
The decision in Beauty Manufacturing raises an interesting question. If a 
contract identifies a particular item as the subject of the contract, and the seller 
delivers an item that is not readily identifiable as being different than that called 
for by the contract, can this ever be a breach of warranty under the reasoning in 
Beauty Manufacturing if the buyer accepts the goods without discovery of the non-
conformity? For example, suppose a contract calls for delivery of gluten-free 
bread and the seller delivers non-gluten-free bread that is accepted by the buyer 
without discovery of the non-conformity. Should this be “better understood as a 
breach of contract” rather than a breach of warranty? Or should the contract 
term calling for gluten-free bread be regarded as a description of the goods 
creating an express warranty under § 2.313(a)(2) of the Code, or even an 
implied warranty of merchantability under § 2.314(b)(1), because non-gluten-
free bread would hardly “pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description”?65 The difficulty of characterization increases if we hypothesize a 
gluten-intolerant buyer who is harmed by eating the bread because § 2.715(b)(2) 
of the Code allows recovery for personal injury or property damage from a 
breach of warranty as consequential damage without requiring that the seller 
have reason to know of any general or particular requirements of the buyer.66 
Such recovery would seemingly be barred if this were a “mere” breach of 
contract. 
Failing to treat the identification of goods in a contract as a description of the 
goods is an overly simplistic way of drawing a line between breach of contract 
and breach of warranty. On the facts of Beauty Manufacturing, the court may 
have been correct because there was some confusion about how the buyer and 
seller identified the product due to the use of different product numbers in their 
respective purchase orders and invoices, and because the buyer seemed to posit 
its warranty claim more on the basis of the warranty of fitness for purpose under 
§ 2.315 of the Code rather than on a warranty of merchantability under § 
2.314.67 The difficulty with the reasoning in Beauty Manufacturing is that it may 
lead to routinely treating identification of goods in a contract as a contract claim 
without giving careful analysis to the possibility that the identification of the 
goods may also have been intended to constitute a warranty.68 
 
 64. Id. at 672. 
 65. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313(a)(2) (West 2009) provides that “[a]ny description 
of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the description.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(b)(1) (West 2009) 
provides that “[g]oods to be merchantable must be at least such as (1) pass without objection in the 
trade under the contract description.” 
 66. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b)(1) (West 2009) provides that a seller may be 
liable for “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller 
at the time of contracting had reason to know. . . .” Section 2.715(b)(2) states no such requirement 
in the case of personal injury or property damage.  
 67. See Beauty Mfg. Solutions Corp., 848 F. Supp. 2d at 671, where the court states that use of 
the identification number “is in some ways an ‘affirmation or promise,’” it did not “‘describe 
attributes, suitability of a particular purpose, [or] ownership of what is sold.’” 
 68. This possibility has already been illustrated by the decision in Berge Helene Ltd. v. GE Oil & 
Gas, Inc., where the court quoted Beauty Manufacturing as support for its conclusion that “[a]ny 
alleged promise of stainless steel piston rods [contained in a flyer and in the contract was a] 
‘contract term identify[ing] what is being sold,’ and not a warranty ‘describ[ing] attributes, 
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In Duran v. City of Eagle Pass, Texas, an individual was incarcerated in a city 
jail.69 During his incarceration, the person hanged himself by using a telephone 
cord attached to a telephone located in the cell. The individual’s mother sued 
the city and the company that had installed the telephone. After suit was 
brought, the city filed a third-party complaint against the installation company. 
Both the plaintiff and the city asserted claims for breach of a warranty of 
merchantability and a warranty of fitness for particular purpose in addition to 
claims for negligence and strict liability. The court held that the claim for breach 
of the warranty of merchantability would not lie because the phone was fit for its 
ordinary purpose and was not unreasonably dangerous.70 In addition, neither 
the plaintiff nor the city gave the installation company notice of the breach.71 As 
to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, however, the court 
rejected the installation company’s argument that a lack of privity barred this 
claim and, citing the similar case of JCW Electronics, Inc. v. Garza,72 denied the 
company’s motion for summary judgment for further proceedings on the issue 
of privity.73 
The requirement of giving notice to avoid being barred from any remedy 
under § 2.607 of the Code was critical to the decision in McKay v. Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp.74 In McKay, a husband and wife sued a pharmaceutical 
company for personal injuries the husband allegedly suffered because of a drug 
manufactured by the company. In addition to strict liability and negligence 
claims, the plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of express and implied 
warranties. On the warranty claims, the court pointed out that the lower Texas 
courts were split on the question of whether a buyer is required to give a remote 
manufacturer notice of breach or whether it is sufficient to give notice only to 
the immediate seller, and that this issue had not been resolved by the Texas 
Supreme Court.75 After reviewing the conflicting decisions, the court adopted 
the view that a buyer must give notice to both the immediate seller and to a 
 
suitability for a particular purpose, and ownership of what is sold.’” Berge Helene Ltd. v. GE Oil & 
Gas, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 582, 605 (S.D. Tex. 2012). Conclusions like this seem contrary to the 
provisions in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313(b) (West 2009) that state that “[i]t is not 
necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or 
‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty . . . .” Perhaps cases like Beauty 
Manufacturing and Berge Helene are indications that the case law is reverting to common law 
approaches that the Code attempted to avoid. 
 69. Duran v. City of Eagle Pass, Tex., No. SA-10-CV-504-XR, 2012 WL 1593185, at *1–2 
(W.D. Tex. May 3, 2012) (setting forth the facts of the case and claims of the parties). 
 70. Id. at *3. 
 71. Id. As noted above in the discussion of the Beauty Manufacturing case, TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (West 2009) requires a buyer to give notice of breach or “be barred from 
any remedy.” 
 72. JCW Electronics, Inc. v. Garza, 176 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005), rev’d 
on other grounds, 257 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. 2008). 
 73. Duran, 2012 WL 1593185, at *3. 
 74. McKay v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 898 (W.D. Tex. 2013). 
 75. Id. at 912. The split among the lower appellate courts was expressly recognized by the 
Supreme Court in its per curiam denial of a writ of error in Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park of Dallas, 
701 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1986), and reiterated in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 
657, 674 n.14 (Tex. 2004). The conflicting cases are collected in McKay, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 913 
n.111. 
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remote manufacturer to satisfy the requirements of § 2.607.76 The court further 
held that the filing of an earlier class action against the manufacturer that did 
not identify the present plaintiff did not suffice for purposes of the notice 
requirement.77 Because of the failure to give effective notice, all of the warranty 
claims were barred.78 
A continuing issue in Texas warranty law is whether attorney’s fees can be 
recoverable in actions for breach of warranty. The question was partially 
answered by the Texas Supreme Court in Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle 
Corp., where it held that attorney’s fees could be recovered in actions for breach 
of express warranty if the plaintiff sought only to recover economic damages for 
failure to perform under the warranty.79 The court did not, however, indicate 
whether its ruling also applied to implied warranties, because that issue was not 
involved on the facts before it. This left a lacuna in the law on whether 
attorney’s fees were recoverable in implied warranty actions.80 This issue was 
further complicated by a statement made by the court during the same term in 
JCW Electronics, Inc. v. Garza that “[i]mplied warranties are created by operation 
of law and are grounded more in tort than in contract.”81 
In the carefully researched and well-reasoned opinion of Howard Industries, 
Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,82 the court examined earlier case law, including 
the decisions in Medical City and JCW Electronics, and concluded they did not 
stand for the proposition that attorney’s fees could never be recovered in 
implied warranty actions because, with one exception, the claims did not seek 
economic damages only, but sought other damages as well.83 Based on its 
analysis of prior cases, the court held that since the plaintiff in the case at bar 
was seeking only economic damages in its implied warranty action, damages 
were recoverable under Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 38.001(38) as a 
claim arising in contract.84 Howard Industries is therefore a significant decision, 
 
 76. McKay, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 77. Id. at 914. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 61–62 (Tex. 2008). 
 80. JCW Electronics, Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 703–05 (Tex. 2008). In two earlier 
decisions, the lower courts had denied recovery of attorney’s fees on either express warranty or 
implied warranty claims. These rulings seemed to have been based on a phrase used in Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. 1991), that “breach of contract and 
breach of warranty are not the same cause of action.” See JHC Ventures, L.P. v. Fast Trucking, Inc., 
94 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Harris Packaging Corp. v. Baker 
Concrete Const. Co., 982 S.W.2d 62, 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). The 
author has previously noted the difficulties created by use of this phrase. See John Krahmer, 
Commercial Transactions, 62 SMU. L. REV. 995, 1002 (2009); John Krahmer, Commercial 
Transactions, 56 SMU L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2003). 
 81. JCW Elect., 257 S.W.3d at 704. 
 82. Howard Indus., Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 403 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 
 83. The cases are collected and discussed in Howard Indus., 403 S.W.2d at 352–53. The one 
exception noted by the court is Basic Energy Service, Inc. v. D-S-B Properties, Inc., 367 S.W.3d 254 
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, no pet.), which the Howard court describes as reaching this conclusion 
“without analysis.” See Howard Indus., 403 S.W.3d at 353. 
 84. Howard Indus., 403 S.W.3d at 353. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) 
(West 2008) allows recovery of attorney’s fees in actions for breach of contract. In situations where 
a defective product only causes damage to itself, the proper cause of action is for breach of warranty 
or breach of contract for economic loss, not negligence or product liability. Thus, in Haynesville 
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which may help settle the previous lack of clarity about the proper 
characterization of implied warranty claims.85 
Shows v. Man Engines & Components, Inc.86 is another significant decision on 
the subject of implied warranties. The engines on a yacht were replaced in 2000, 
then, in 2002, the yacht was sold by the then-current owner to the plaintiff who 
purchased the yacht with knowledge that the yacht and engines were used goods. 
In 2004, one of the engines failed and was repaired. A year later, the engine 
failed again and could not be repaired. The plaintiff sued the engine 
manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The jury 
found in favor of the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the defendant’s 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, relying in part on the ground 
that under Texas law no implied warranties arise in the sale of used goods.87 On 
appeal, the court pointed out that while it was true that several appellate court 
cases had held that no warranties arise in the sale of used goods, the Texas 
Supreme Court had never ruled on this issue.88 The court distinguished these 
cases on the ground that the plaintiff in the case at bar was not suing the 
immediate seller for a breach of implied warranty arising when the plaintiff 
purchased the yacht, but instead, the suit was against the engine manufacturer 
for breach of the implied warranty that arose when the new engines were sold to 
a previous owner and installed in the yacht.89 Relying on Nobility Homes of Texas, 
Inc. v. Shivers,90 the court also held that privity was not required in the plaintiff’s 
action against the manufacturer.91 The court reversed the judgment of the trial 
court and remanded the case to reinstate the jury verdict and to determine the 
attorney’s fees to which the plaintiff might be entitled.92 The grant of a petition 
to review in Shows may portend further development on the issue of implied 
warranties in the sale of used goods. 
C.  DISCLAIMERS AND LIMITATION OF DAMAGES 
The Code allows both the disclaimer of warranties and the limitation of 
 
Shale Rentals, LLC v. Total Equip. & Serv., Inc., No. H-12-0860, 2012 WL 4867603, at *4–5 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 12, 2012) (mem. op.), claims for breach of warranty under the Code and under the 
DTPA were properly pled, but the negligence and product liability claims were dismissed. 
 85. Structural Metals, Inc. v. S & C Electric Co., No. SA-09-CV-984-XR, 2013 WL 3790307, 
at *1, n.1 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2013). The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had not yet 
ruled on whether attorney’s fees are recoverable in implied warranty actions, but cited Howard 
Industries as a case allowing such recovery. 
 86. Shows v. Man Engines & Components, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2012, pet. granted). 
 87. Id. at 351–52. 
 88. Id. at 352 n.3. The first Texas case to hold that implied warranties do not arise in the sale 
of used goods was Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Machinery Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). Subsequent cases relying on Chaq Oil are cited in the Shows 
opinion. See Shows, 364 S.W.3d at 352–53. The author has noted elsewhere that dicta in the 
Supreme Court decision in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry Cnty. Spraying Services, Inc., 572 
S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978), seems to suggest that used goods might carry an implied warranty of 
merchantability. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 37 SW. L. J. 145, 152 n.55 (1983). 
 89. Shows, 364 S.W.3d at 353. 
 90. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). 
 91. Shows, 364 S.W.3d at 354–55. 
 92. Id. at 359. 
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damages.93 A disclaimer differs from a limitation of damages in that a 
disclaimer, if effective, prevents a warranty from arising at all. In contrast, a 
limitation of damages clause does not prevent creation of a warranty, but limits 
the damages recoverable for a breach of warranty or a breach of contract. In 
Integrated Marine Services, L.L.C. v. Hoist Liftruck Mfg.,94 a dealer in heavy 
equipment argued that its dealer agreement barred a purchaser from asserting 
claims for breach of the warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose. Noting that these warranties arise under the Code 
unless they are conspicuously excluded, the court held that the dealer agreement 
contained no conspicuous language excluding either warranty, and therefore 
denied the dealer’s motion to dismiss the warranty claims.95 
An issue closely related to warranties arising under the Code involves the 
common law warranty of good and workmanlike performance in the repair or 
modification of tangible property, announced by the Texas Supreme Court in its 
1987 decision in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes.96 As part of its 
decision, the court added that this warranty could not be waived or disclaimed.97 
In Centex Homes v. Buecher,98 the court addressed the relationship between the 
warranty of good and workmanlike performance arising from the decision in 
Melody and the warranty of habitability and good workmanship in the 
construction of new homes that was created in Humber v. Morton99 in 1968. The 
court in Centex noted the parallel relationship of the warranties in Melody and 
Humber and that it had previously “conflated” the two warranties, leading to 
uncertainty about waivers or disclaimers of these warranties.100 After reviewing 
the history and purposes of the warranty of habitability and the warranty of 
good workmanship, the court held that the warranty of habitability could not be 
disclaimed as to latent defects affecting use of a home, but that the warranty of 
good workmanship could be “superseded” by an express warranty that set out 
the standards by which the workmanship was to be measured.101 
In a significant decision in Gonzales v. Olshan Foundation Repair Co., the Texas 
Supreme Court provided guidance on the specificity required to permit an 
express warranty to supersede the implied warranty of good workmanship.102 
The express warranty in question specified that the foundation repair company 
would employ its “Cable Lock”® system in a good and workmanlike manner 
 
 93. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (West 2009) (stating standards for effective 
disclaimers);TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.718 (West 2009) (stating requirements for the 
liquidation or limitation of damages). 
 94. Integrated Marine Services, L.L.C. v. Hoist Liftruck Mfg., No. H-12-1379, 2012 WL 
3779308 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2012). 
 95. Id. at *2. 
 96. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353–54 (Tex. 1987). 
 97. Id. at 355. 
 98. Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 269–70 (Tex. 2002). 
 99. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968). 
 100. Centex, 95 S.W.3d at 270–71. The court referred to its decision in G–W–L, Inc. v. 
Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982), as the case in which it had failed to distinguish between 
the warranties of good workmanship and habitability resulting in uncertainty about the ability to 
waive or disclaim these warranties. See Centex, 95 S.W.3d at 270. 
 101. Centex, 95 S.W.3d at 274–75. 
 102. Gonzales v. Olshan Found. Repair Co., 400 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. 2013). 
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and level the foundation if settling of the foundation occurred in the future.103 
When problems with the repair later arose, the plaintiff sought recovery under 
common law and under the DTPA for breach of express warranty and for 
breach of the warranty of good workmanship. The jury found that the repair 
company had not breached the express warranty, but had breached the implied 
warranty. The plaintiff prevailed at trial and the repair company appealed. On 
appeal, the court of appeals held that the action for breach of the implied 
warranty could be brought only under the DTPA and that the action was barred 
because it had been brought more than two years and eight months after 
discovery of the repair problems.104 On further appeal, the Supreme Court 
applied the rationale of Centex and held that the express warranty sufficiently 
described the “manner, performance, and quality” to supersede the implied 
warranty.105 Because the implied warranty was superseded, the court did not 
find it necessary to address the issue of whether an implied warranty claim could 
be brought only under the DTPA.106 The court also noted that it was not 
expressing an opinion on whether the plaintiff could assert a future claim under 
a separate “lifetime” warranty of repair.107 Gonzales is a helpful case in 
understanding the difference between the inability to have an outright 
disclaimer of the implied warranty of good workmanship and the ability to 
supersede the implied warranty by a properly drafted express warranty describing 
the “manner, performance, and quality” of the work to be performed. 
In a potentially significant decision in Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Advance 
International, Inc., a retailer ordered two shipments of inflatable outdoor 
Christmas snowmen from a seller.108 When the shipments were delivered, the 
buyer discovered that the design of the snowmen differed from that specified in 
the contract. Despite the non-conformity, the buyer accepted the snowmen and 
sold all of them at the originally advertised price. No customers complained 
about the design difference, but the buyer refused to pay for the goods. In an 
action for declaratory judgment brought by the buyer to enforce a liquidated 
damages clause that would absolve the buyer from paying for the goods, the 
seller counterclaimed for the full price of the goods. The buyer contended that 
the liquidated damage provision in the contract allowed the buyer to “charge-
back” the entire price of the orders. The seller argued that the provision was 
 
 103. Id. at 56–57. A description of the repair company’s Cable Lock® system may be found at 
http://www.olshanfoundation.com/content/about-cable-lock-st-plus. 
 104. See Southwest Olshan Found. Rep. Co, LLC v. Gonzales, 345 S.W.3d 431, 440 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 2011) aff’d, 400 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013). Section 17.565 of the DTPA states 
that actions must be brought within two years after discovery of “a false, misleading, or deceptive 
act or practice.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (West 2009). The limitation period may 
be extended for 180 days if the plaintiff shows that the defendant knowingly induced the plaintiff 
to delay filing an action. Id. Even with an extension, the plaintiff in Gonzales did not file suit until 
two years and eight months after discovery and the court noted this was beyond even the extended 
limitation period. Gonzales, 400 S.W.3d at 59. 
 105. Gonzales, 400 S.W.3d at 59. 
 106. Id. at 55 n.9. In concluding that it was not necessary to reach this issue, the court did note 
a division of opinion among the courts on whether breach of the warranty of good workmanship 
could be brought as a common law claim or could only be brought under the DTPA. 
 107. Id. at 53 n.3. 
 108. Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Adv. Int’l, Inc., 403 S.W.3d 432, 435–36 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2013, pet granted (setting forth the facts of the case and the parties’ assertions). 
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void as a penalty because the buyer was able to sell all of the goods at the 
intended price and suffered no damage. The court agreed with the seller and 
held that because the buyer’s actual damages were zero, the liquidated damages 
clause was an unenforceable penalty.109 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that § 2.718 of the Code and the common law both allowed a court to 
determine the effectiveness of a liquidated damages clause as a matter of law.110 
A concurring opinion argued that the majority misapplied the provisions of § 
2.718 by failing to recognize that the validity of a liquidated damages clause 
should be based on whether the amount specified by the clause was reasonable 
in light of either the actual harm or in light of the anticipated harm.111 According 
to the concurring opinion, by comparing only the amount stated in the 
liquidated damages clause with the actual harm caused, the majority’s ruling 
conflicted with that of two other courts of appeal about application of § 
2.718.112 The concurring opinion also argued that by requiring only a 
comparison of liquidated damages to actual damages, the majority ignored a 
legislative intent to allow parties to contractually estimate damages in sale of 
goods situations based on information available to them at the time of 
contracting.113 Somewhat ironically, the concurrence expressed the hope that a 
petition for review that had been granted in one of the conflicting cases might 
result in a resolution of the conflict by the Texas Supreme Court.114 As it turned 
out, a petition for review has also been granted in Garden Ridge so there will 
actually be two opportunities for the Supreme Court to speak on the issue of 
how liquidated damage clauses should be evaluated. 
D.  SELLER’S RIGHT OF RESCISSION VERSUS PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST 
In In re Steel Stadiums, Ltd., a steel supplier entered into a contract to sell steel 
to a building contractor that specialized in the construction and renovation of 
football stadiums.115 The supplier made an initial delivery of steel to the 
contractor, but the contractor failed to pay for the shipment. When the 
contractor placed an order for additional steel, the supplier met with 
representatives of the contractor to discuss the situation. During this meeting, 
the supplier was assured that the contractor was solvent, that payment for the 
first shipment would be made, and that the contractor would sign a credit 
agreement and a personal guaranty for further shipments. Satisfied with these 
arrangements, the supplier made the second shipment. Unbeknownst to the 
 
 109. Id. at 441. 
 110. Id. at 440. 
 111. Id. at 446. 
 112. See id. at 450 (citing TXU Portfolio Management Co. v. FPL Energy, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 
580, 587–88 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. granted) (holding liquidated damages clause valid where 
actual damages difficult to estimate); McFadden v. Fuentes, 790 S.W.2d 736, 737–38 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1990, no writ) (holding legal standard for determining validity of liquidated damages clause 
under § 2.718 differs from standard under Texas common law)). 
 113. Garden Ridge, 403 S.W.3d at 449–50. 
 114. Id. at 450. The conflicting decision to which the concurrence referred was TXU Portfolio 
Management Co. v. FPL Energy, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 580, 587–88 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. 
granted). 
 115. In re Steel Stadiums, Ltd., No. 11-42632-DML, 2013 WL 145628, at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. Jan. 14, 2014) (mem. op.) (setting forth the facts and procedural history of the case). 
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supplier, the contractor had previously obtained financing by granting a security 
interest in the contractor’s equipment and inventory to a bank, which had 
properly perfected the security interest. When the contractor failed to pay for 
the second shipment, the supplier sued in state court to rescind the contract, 
obtain return of the second shipment of steel, and recover the unpaid balance 
from the earlier shipment. Soon after this suit was filed, the contractor was 
forced into an involuntary bankruptcy and the state action was removed to the 
bankruptcy court. 
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the issue was whether the supplier or the bank 
had priority in the second shipment of steel.116 Neither the plaintiff supplier 
(which had considerable self-interest in doing comprehensive research) nor the 
court (which seems to have been intrigued by the issue) was able to find any 
precedent in Texas or elsewhere addressing the relative priorities between a 
seller asserting a right to rescind and a secured party holding a perfected security 
interest.117 The court, however, did find numerous cases addressing reclamation 
claims under § 2.702 of the Code and equitable lien claims, which uniformly 
held that a perfected security interest had priority over a seller’s claims.118 
Reasoning that a claim for rescission was essentially the same as a claim for 
reclamation, and noting that both § 2.702 of the Code and § 546 of the 
Bankruptcy Code subordinate reclamation claims to the claim of a perfected 
secured party, the court held that the bank had the superior claim.119 The bank’s 
motion to dismiss the supplier’s claim was granted.120 
IV.  LEASES OF GOODS 
A.  BUYERS OF LEASED GOODS 
One of the risks facing a lessor of goods is that the lessee may sell the leased 
goods to a buyer who acquires a superior right to the goods by virtue of the rules 
stated in §§ 2A.305 and 2A.310 of the Code.121 These rules are similar to those 
governing good faith purchases by buyers in the ordinary course of business 
under the provisions of § 2.403 of the Code.122 “Buyer in the ordinary course of 
business” is defined in § 1.201 of the Code.123 While the definition is fairly 
complex, the baseline rule is that a buyer in the ordinary course of business is 
one who, in good faith, buys goods from a merchant who is in the business of 
selling goods of that kind (i.e., buyers who buy out of a seller’s usual 
 
 116. Id. at *2. 
 117. Id. at *4. 
 118. Id. (collecting and summarizing cases). 
 119. Id. at *4–5; see 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (allowing sellers to reclaim goods sold on credit 
within the time limits stated in that section, but also providing that the seller’s rights are “subject to 
the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof . . .”). 
 120. In re Steel, 2013 WL 145628, at *6. 
 121. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2A.305 & .310 (West 2009) state circumstances in 
which a buyer in the ordinary course of business can acquire an interest in goods superior to that of 
the lessor.  
 122. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (West 2009). 
 123. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(9) (West 2009). 
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inventory).124 
In Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. v. RPK Capital XVI, L.L.C., following a 
convoluted history of ownership, leases, and repairs, an aircraft was sold by the 
then-current owner in a liquidation sale after completing a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganization.125 At one point during its history, thrust reversers 
had been installed on the aircraft, and the purchaser was not aware that the 
thrust reversers were subject to a lease. The lessor of the thrust reversers sued the 
purchaser for conversion to recover them, for lost profits resulting from loss of 
their use, and for damage to the reversers. The purchaser contended that it was a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business with a superior right to the reversers 
under § 2A.310 of the Code.126 The trial court held that a buyer at a liquidation 
sale could not, as a matter of law, qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of 
business.127 The court of appeals held that this ruling was overly broad and that 
buyers could sometimes qualify as buyers in the ordinary course of business.128 
Nonetheless, based on the facts before it, the court upheld the determination 
that the buyer was not a buyer in the ordinary course of business because the 
seller was not engaged in the business of routinely selling aircraft but, instead, 
was selling capital assets to raise money to pay creditors rather than selling 
inventory.129 The lessor was entitled, therefore, to recover the thrust reversers in 
its action for conversion.130 However, the court denied recovery of lost profits 
because of a failure to show the amount of lost profits with reasonable 
certainty.131 The claim for damage to the thrust reversers was also denied 
because there was no evidence that the damage occurred while the reversers were 
in the buyer’s possession.132 
V.  NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
A.  TRANSFER AND ENFORCEMENT 
Not surprisingly, several of the negotiable instrument cases reported since 
publication of the last Survey involved issues surrounding mortgage foreclosures. 
One common contention was that the foreclosing party failed to show that it 
was the holder of the note. In non-judicial foreclosures, the courts pointed out 
that the Texas Property Code does not require a foreclosing lien holder to 
produce the note as a prerequisite to enforcing a lien.133 When a note was 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. v. RPK Capital XVI, L.L.C., 360 S.W.3d 691, 696–98 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (setting forth the facts of the case and lessor’s claims). 
 126. Id. at 703. 
 127. Id. at 703–04. 
 128. Id. at 704. On this point, the court cited In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. 496, 509–10 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) and Amarillo Nat’l Bank v. Komatsu Zenoah Am., Inc., 991 F.2d 273, 277 (5th 
Cir. 1993), as examples of cases holding that good faith purchase could occur even if goods were 
being sold in liquidation. 
 129. Wells Fargo, 360 S.W.3d at 705. 
 130. Id. at 713. 
 131. Id. at 712. 
 132. Id. at 708. 
 133. See, e.g.¸ Scott v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. SA-12-CV-00917-DAE, 2013 WL 1821874, at *3 
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produced in the course of the proceedings, the courts generally referred to 
provisions in the Code allowing transfer by blank indorsement, enforcement by 
a party in possession, or by a party not in possession who proves ownership of 
the note.134 When transfer, ownership, or the right to enforce is not evident 
from the documents provided by the party seeking to enforce a note, the issue is 
one of fact, and the claim of improper foreclosure should not be dismissed at 
the pleading stage.135 An interesting variant on foreclosure challenges occurred 
in MacFadden v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC., where the mortgagor asserted he had 
paid the amount due on the mortgage by sending the mortgagee a document he 
called a “check,” but which contained additional language indicating it was sent 
“without recourse” and designating it as an electronic funds transfer that was for 
discharge of debt and not for deposit.136 Noting that such a document was an 
example of a “debt-elimination scheme” that was beginning to appear around 
the country, the court had no difficulty in holding that the document was 
neither a check nor an effective electronic funds transfer.137 Judgment on the 
pleadings was granted in favor of the mortgagee.138 
 
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2013) (non-judicial foreclosure of lien on real property does not require 
production of note under TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 51.002 & .0025 (West 2007)); Tyler v. Bank of 
Am., N.A., No. SA-12-CV-00909-DAE, 2013 WL 1821754, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2013) (same); 
Rodriguez v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. SA-12-CV-00905-DAE, 2013 WL 1773670, at *6–7 (W.D. 
Tex. Apr. 25, 2013) (same); Swim v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:11-CV-1240-M, 2012 WL 170758, 
at *3 n.25 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2012) (same and collecting cases); Bierwirth v. BAC Home Loans 
Serv., L.P., No. 03-11-0644-CV, 2012 WL 3793190, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2012, no 
pet.) (mem. op.) (same). 
 134. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. SA-12-CV-00905-DAE, 2013 WL 1773670, 
at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2013) (holding transfer of note by blank indorsement is effective under 
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.205(b) (West 2009)); Scott v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. SA-12-
CV-00917-DAE, 2013 WL 1821874, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2013) (holding person in possession 
is entitled to enforce note under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (West 2009)); Martin v. 
New Century Mortg. Co., 377 S.W.3d 79, at 84–85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet. 
h.) (holding person not in possession can enforce note upon proof of transfer under TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (West 2009)). 
 135. Bacon v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn., No. 4:12cv86, 2012 WL 4506532, at *4–5 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 31, 2012) (holding allegation of fraud in transfer of note sufficient to avoid motion to dismiss 
absent contrary documentary evidence). 
 136. MacFadden v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC., No. 2:13-CV-91, 2013 WL 2422579, at *3 (S.D. 
Tex. June 3, 2013). 
 137. Id. at *4–6. In describing the “debt-elimination scheme,” the court quoted at some length 
from the opinion in Koch v. Home Network Mortg., LLC, No. 12-CV-14760, 2013 WL 392902, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. 2013), where the mortgagor made a similar claim in challenging a foreclosure. Several 
additional cases involving marking a “check” with language stating “EFT only!” and “Not for 
Deposit, EFT only, For Discharge of Debt” have been reported. See, e.g., Stout v. CarMax Auto Fin., 
No. 12-2996, 2013 WL 6231152, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2013) (dismissing debtor’s claim that 
payment was effected by check bearing described markings); Reid v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 
No. 12 Civ. 7436(AC)(JLC), 2013 WL 3776201, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 18, 2013) (granting creditor’s 
motion to dismiss where check containing described markings was neither a negotiable instrument 
nor an electronic funds transfer); Twinstar Credit Union v. Canzoni, No. 43609-4-II, 2014 WL 
129257, at *2, *6 (Wash. App. Div. 2, Jan. 14, 2014) (unpublished op.) (where a check containing 
such markings and drawn on non-existent account did not discharge debtor from liability); Alaska 
USA Fed. Credit Union v. Holland, No. 70313-7-1, 2014 WL 117427, at *2–3 (Wash. App. Div. 1, 
Jan. 13, 2014) (not discharging debtor where lender refused to accept check containing described 
markings); Blocker v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 993 N.E.2d 1154, 1155–58 (Ind. App. 2013) (holding 
purported instrument containing described markings was “unorthodox” and not “legally 
acceptable” attempt to pay debt and discussing such instruments as part of a “redemptionist” or 
“vapor money” theory). 
 138. MacFadden, 2013 WL 2422579, at *8. 
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When an action is for enforcement of a note rather than foreclosure of a lien, 
§ 3.308 of the Code provides that a plaintiff is entitled to recover if the plaintiff 
is a person entitled to enforce the note under § 3.301 of the Code and the 
defendant fails to prove a defense or a claim in recoupment.139 Negotiability of 
the note is not an issue if the action is between immediate parties to the note, 
and the burden of proof shifts to the maker to establish a defense.140 If a 
defendant maker asserts a defense, the burden is on the plaintiff to show 
entitlement to payment; an affidavit authenticating the note, the signatures, and 
the amount due is sufficient to raise issues of material fact to avoid summary 
judgment in favor of the maker.141 
B.  LIABILITY OF PARTIES ON INSTRUMENTS AND GUARANTIES 
The decisions in 84 Lumber Co. v. Powers142 and in Playboy Enterprises v. 
Sanchez-Campuzano143 illustrate an issue that can arise when instruments or 
guaranties are signed by agents. In 84 Lumber, an agent identified himself as the 
president of the borrower and added that he “unconditionally and irrevocably 
personally” guaranteed a credit account.144 Because the signatory language did 
not merely indicate that the signer was signing in his capacity as an agent of the 
corporation, but also stated that he was personally guaranteeing the debt, the 
court had no difficulty in holding him personally liable for unpaid amounts 
under the credit agreement.145 In Playboy Enterprises, an individual signed a 
guaranty agreement as the purported agent for a non-existent entity.146 In an 
action to enforce the guaranty, the guarantor argued that under § 3.402 of the 
Code, he was not liable on the guaranty because the parties understood that he 
was signing only as an agent.147 There were two problems with this argument. 
First, the guaranty agreement was not a negotiable instrument so § 3.402 did 
not apply. However, regardless of the application of that section, the Texas law 
of guaranties parallels that of the Code, and a “subjective belief” on the part of a 
guarantor was not sufficient to establish a contrary understanding between the 
parties.148 Furthermore, by signing as the purported representative of a non-
existent entity, the guarantor became personally liable for the debt.149 
 
 139. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.301 & .308 (West 2009). 
 140. See Ropa Exploration Corp. v. Barash Energy, Ltd., No. 02-11-00258-CV, 2013 WL 
2631164, at *5, *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 141. See Dorsett v. Hispanic Housing and Educ. Corp., 389 S.W.3d 609, 613–14 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no. pet.). 
 142. 84 Lumber Co. v. Powers, 393 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 
 143. Playboy Enterprises v. Sanchez-Campuzano, 519 F. App’x 219 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2013) 
(unpublished decision). 
 144. 84 Lumber Co., 393 S.W.3d at 305. 
 145. Id. at 307. 
 146. Playboy Enterprises, 519 F. App’x at 224. 
 147. Id. at 226; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(b)(2) (West 2009) (“[T]he 
representative is liable on the instrument unless the representative proves that the original parties 
did not intend the representative to be liable on the instrument.”). 
 148. Playboy Enterprises, 519 F. App’x at 227. 
 149. Id. This is the same result that obtains under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(a) 
(West 2009) imposing liability on the unauthorized signer of a note. A classic statement of this rule 
appears in New Georgia Nat’l Bank v. J. & G. Lippmann, 164 N.E. 108, 109 (N.Y. 1928), where 
Justice Cardozo said, “We think the proviso [in the Negotiable Instruments Law] that the agent or 
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In Chance v. Citimortgage, Inc., the maker of a note argued that he had been 
discharged from liability by virtue of a stamped notation marking a blank 
indorsement on the back of the note as “Void.”150 Referring to § 3.604 of the 
Code, the court held that stamping the indorsement void did not evidence an 
intentional cancellation of the note or release of the maker from liability.151 
Summary judgment against the maker was affirmed.152 
C.  ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY USE OF AN INSTRUMENT 
Under § 3.311 of the Code, disputed claims can be settled by an accord and 
satisfaction between the parties.153 In Barnes v. University Federal Credit Union, a 
borrower and a lender were at odds about the borrower’s failure to provide 
proof of insurance on two vehicles she had used to collateralize two loans.154 
After engaging in some initial litigation, the lender proposed a settlement that 
would release all of the lender’s claims and cancel the vehicle liens in exchange 
for payment of $8,000 by the borrower. The borrower did not sign the 
settlement agreement, but did send a cashier’s check in the proper amount to 
the lender. When the check was received, the lender sent a letter to the 
borrower stating that it would not accept or cash the check until the settlement 
agreement was signed and returned, but the lender did not return the check. 
During the following six months, the lender sent additional letters asking the 
borrower to sign and return the settlement agreement. She did not do so and 
ultimately obtained a refund for a lost cashier’s check from the issuing bank. 
The borrower then sued the lender on the theory that the lender’s retention of 
the check for at least six months amounted to an accord and satisfaction despite 
the borrower’s failure to sign the settlement agreement. Both parties moved for 
summary judgment, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the 
lender. On appeal by the borrower, while recognizing that retention of a 
cashier’s check for an unreasonable period of time can result in an accord and 
satisfaction, the court pointed out that application of this rule depends on the 
circumstances of each case.155 Because the lender had immediately notified the 
 
representative shall not be liable on the instrument ‘if he was duly authorized’ to sign, carries with 
it a fair implication that he should be so liable if not authorized.” Issues of this kind are not limited 
to negotiable instruments, but can take place in the closely related area of guaranty agreements. 
 150. Chance v. Citimortgage, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). 
 151. Id. at 313–14. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.604(a) (West 2009) provides: 
A person entitled to enforce an instrument, with or without consideration, may 
discharge the obligation of a party to pay the instrument: (1) by an intentional 
voluntary act, such as surrender of the instrument to the party, destruction, 
mutilation, or cancellation of the instrument, cancellation or striking out of the 
party’s signature, or the addition of words to the instrument indicating discharge; or 
(2) by agreeing not to sue or otherwise renouncing rights against the party by a 
signed writing. 
 152. Chance, 395 S.W.3d at 316. 
 153. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311 (West 2009). 
 154. Barnes v. University Federal Credit Union, No. 03-10-00147-CV, 2013 WL 1748788, at 
*1–2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (setting forth case facts and procedural 
history). 
 155. Id. at *6 (citing Tarrant Wholesale Drug Co. v. Kendall, 223 S.W.2d 964, 966–67 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—San Antonio 1949, no writ), Willis v. City Nat’l Bank of Galveston, 280 S.W. 270, 273 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1926, writ ref’d); Curran v. Bray Wood Heel Co., 68 A.2d 712, 718 (Vt. 
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borrower that it would not accept the check absent signing of the settlement 
agreement and the borrower’s failure to demand return of the check, the court 
held that the trial court could properly determine that no accord and 
satisfaction had taken place.156 Furthermore, under § 3.311, the borrower had 
not conspicuously indicated on the check or in a letter accompanying the check 
that it was being tendered in full satisfaction of the lender’s claims as required 
by that section.157 The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court 
but did order a remittitur for part of the lender’s attorney fees that had been 
granted by the trial court.158 
VI.  BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 
A.  CUSTOMER’S DUTY TO NOTIFY BANK ABOUT IMPROPERLY PAID ITEMS 
Section 4.406 of the Code requires a customer to notify the bank within one 
year after the customer discovers that the bank has paid items that were altered 
or that were not authorized by the customer.159 Under various circumstances, 
this time period may be shortened by other provisions in § 4.406 or by the terms 
of a deposit agreement. In Coffey v. Bank of America, an estate administrator 
discovered that a bank had paid several unauthorized checks from the 
decedent’s account.160 Under the deposit agreement, notice of unauthorized 
checks was to be given within sixty days after a statement of account was sent to 
the customer. The administrator received the decedent’s bank records after her 
appointment as administrator, but instead of giving notice of the unauthorized 
payments, the administrator filed suit instead. The bank contended that filing 
suit did not satisfy the notice requirement in the deposit agreement. The trial 
court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. On appeal by 
the administrator, the court affirmed, holding that the administrator’s petition 
did not identify the checks or the amount of any improper payments.161 While 
the suit notified the bank that the administrator “suspected problems” about 
payments from the account, the deposit agreement clearly required more specific 
 
1949)). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *7. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311(b) (West 2009) states, in part, that a 
“claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or 
an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the 
instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.” 
 158. Barnes, 2013 WL 1748288, at *17. 
 159. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(f) (West 2009) provides: 
 Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank, a 
customer who does not within one year after the statement or items are made 
available to the customer (Subsection (a)) discover and report the customer’s 
unauthorized signature on or any alteration on the item is precluded from asserting 
against the bank the unauthorized signature or alteration. If there is a preclusion 
under this subsection, the payor bank may not recover for breach of warranty under 
Section 4.208 with respect to the unauthorized signature or alteration to which the 
preclusion applies. 
 160. Coffey v. Bank of Am., No. 09-12-00113-CV, 2013 WL 257363, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Jan. 24, 2013) (mem. op.) (setting forth the facts of the case and its procedural history). 
 161. Id. at *6–7. 
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information about the items or payments on which the administrator was basing 
her complaint.162 
An estate administrator’s complaints about payments made from a decedent’s 
account in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Lenk163 became the second case to 
reach the Texas Supreme Court as a result of the fraudulent machinations of 
Melvyn Spillman, a county clerk who named himself as executor of unclaimed 
estates and then raided bank accounts held by the estates.164 In the first Lenk 
case, the court held that the one-year bar in § 4.406 began to run from the date 
the administrator was appointed and that the one year period had elapsed 
before notice of improper payments was given to the bank.165 In the second Lenk 
case, the administrator sued for breach of contract to recover all of the funds on 
deposit at the time of the decedent’s death.166 The court distinguished its earlier 
decision because, in that case, the bank asserted the § 4.406 statute of repose as 
a defense to the administrator’s action; in this case, the bank did not raise § 
4.406 as an affirmative defense but, instead, defended on the ground that it had 
not breached the deposit agreement and did not cause injury to the estate.167 
The court reasoned that as a breach of contract case, the administrator’s claim 
was subject to a four-year limitation period under the Texas Finance Code and 
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; hence, the claim was timely.168 The 
judgment of the court of appeals in favor of the administrator was affirmed.169 A 
strong dissenting opinion argued that the majority had misconstrued the 
provisions of the Finance Code by ignoring part of the provision stating that a 
bank is deemed to have denied liability when it provides a statement or 
passbook to its customer.170 According to the dissent, this misreading of the 
Finance Code allowed the administrator to create a cause of action with a four-
year limitation period and avoid the one-year statute of repose stated in § 
4.406.171 
VII.  FUNDS TRANSFERS 
A.  SELECTION OF COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE SECURITY PROCEDURE 
In All American Siding & Windows, Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., a bank 
customer discovered that two unauthorized wire transfers and one unauthorized 
automated clearinghouse transfer had been made from the customer’s account 
 
 162. Id. at *7. 
 163. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2012). 
 164. Spillman’s activities and how he perpetrated the fraud for several years are described in 
John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 63 SMU L. REV. 425, 444–45 (2010). 
 165. See Jefferson State Bank v. Lenk, 323 S.W.3d 146, 147 (Tex. 2010). 
 166. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 361 S.W.3d at 605. 
 167. Id. at 605–06. 
 168. Id. at 610 (discussing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 34.301(b) (West 2013) and TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (West 2008)). 
 169. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 361 S.W.3d at 612. 
 170. Id. at 613. 
 171. Id. at 613–14 (stating that by allowing the administrator to create a breach of contract 
claim by making a delayed demand for payment, the misconstruction of TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 
34.301(b) (West 2013) would “be significant to the entire financial industry in Texas.”). 
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between September 10th and September 12th, 2008.172 The customer notified 
the bank, and the bank was able to recover part of the funds. However, the bank 
refused to reimburse the customer for the amount that could not be recovered. 
The case hinged on two provisions in the account agreement. First, the 
agreement placed “sole responsibility” on the customer to select a security 
procedure from the group of procedures offered by the bank.173 Second, the 
agreement provided that it could not be modified except in writing.174 The court 
held that the security procedure offered by the bank was commercially 
reasonable and that the bank had acted in good faith in its use of the 
procedure.175 The customer, therefore, was bound by § 4A.202 of the Code due 
to the customer’s selection of the procedure.176 The court also held that the 
account agreement barred the customer from recovering on its claim that the 
bank had orally agreed to reimburse the total amount of the unauthorized 
transfers.177 Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the bank.178 
VIII.  SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
A.  PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS 
Under Chapter 9 of the Code, a security interest must be perfected to obtain 
maximum protection against claims asserted by competing creditors, lienholders, 
trustees in bankruptcy, and the like. Filing a financing statement in the correct 
public record is probably the most common method used to perfect a security 
interest. In re Diabetes America, Inc.179 and Westlake Styrene, LLC v. United States180 
are good illustrations of the right way and the wrong way to select a public 
record in which a filing should be made. Under § 9.301 of the Code, filings 
should generally be made in the jurisdiction where the debtor is located.181 
“Registered organizations,” such as corporations, are deemed to be located in 
the state of organization.182 In Diabetes America, the debtor was organized in 
Delaware.183 The secured party mistakenly believed, however, that a choice-of-
law clause in the security agreement providing that Texas law would apply to its 
 
 172. All American Siding & Windows, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 367 S.W.3d 490, 494–95 
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied) (setting forth the facts of the case). 
 173. Id. at 499. 
 174. Id. at 500. 
 175. Id. at 500–01. 
 176. Id. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4A.202(b) (West 2009) provides that a customer is 
bound by selection of a commercially reasonable security procedure and the bank proves that it 
accepted a payment order in good faith. 
 177. All American, 367 S.W.3d at 501. 
 178. Id. at 502–03. 
 179. In re Diabetes Am., Inc., No. 10-41521, 2012 WL 6694074 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 
2012) (mem. op.). 
 180. Westlake Styrene, LLC v. United States, No. H-10-2631, 2012 WL 2133550 (S.D. Tex. 
June 11, 2012). 
 181. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(1) (West 2009). 
 182. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307 (West 2009) (stating rules for determining the 
location of a debtor). 
 183. In re Diabetes Am., 2012 WL 6694074, at *4. 
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loan transaction mandated filing in Texas.184 In what is almost a how-to-do-it 
text on filing, the court described how the Chapter 9 filing rules work and 
where the secured party erred in its reading of § 9.301.185 Because of the failure 
to file in the right jurisdiction, the security interest was unperfected and the 
secured party was a mere unsecured creditor with no greater rights than other 
unsecured creditors in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.186 In contrast, in 
Westlake Styrene, the secured party correctly identified Texas as the location of a 
corporate debtor and perfected its security interest by making a Texas filing even 
though the debtor’s business activities were conducted in Louisiana.187 As in 
Diabetes America, the court pointed out that under § 9.301, a corporation is 
located in its state of incorporation for purposes of filing.188 
In addition to filing in the wrong location, another thing that can go wrong 
with a filing is the failure to use the correct name of the debtor on a financing 
statement. This may sound like a self-evident statement. Obviously, a secured 
party making a loan to Jane Doe shouldn’t identify the debtor as “Richard Roe” 
on the financing statement. On another level, however, §§ 9.503 and 9.506 of 
the Code are quite specific about what constitutes the correct name of a 
debtor.189 The secured party in CNH Capital America, LLC v. Progreso Materials 
Ltd. learned this the hard way when it left the letter “s” off of the word 
“Materials” in the debtor’s name.190 The court held that this omission made the 
financing statement seriously misleading and rendered the security interest 
unperfected.191 
While the requirements for determining the correct name of a debtor on a 
financing statement are quite specific, the rules are less stringent if perfection 
depends on the name of a secured party used in noting a lien on a certificate of 
title. Thus, in In re Hoffman, a secured party properly perfected its security 
interest in a motor vehicle by identifying itself with an assumed name on the 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *4–5. 
 186. Id. at *6. 
 187. Westlake Styrene, LLC v. United States, No. H-10-2631, 2012 WL 2133550, at *4 (S.D. 
Tex. June 11, 2012). 
 188. Id. 
 189. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.503, .506 (West 2009) (containing rules for 
determining the correct name of organizational debtors, trusts, estates, and individuals). 
 190. CNH Capital Am., LLC v. Progreso Materials Ltd., No. M-10-478, 2012 WL 5305697, at 
*4–5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 191. Id. Slight misspelling of a debtor’s name has been found fatal to perfection in numerous 
cases. See, e.g., In re Jim Ross Tires, Inc., 379 B.R. 670 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that filing 
in the name “Jim Ross Tires, Inc. d/b/a HTC Tires & Automotive Centers” was not effective to 
perfect security interest where organization’s name did not include the dba name; further holding a 
separate filing in the name “Jim Ross Tire Inc.” was ineffective because of omission of letter “s” in 
the word “Tires”); Host Am. Corp. v. Coastline Fin., Inc., No. 2:06CV5, 2006 WL 1579614 (D. 
Utah May 30, 2006) (holding that identifying a debtor as “KWM Electronics Corporation” instead 
of “K.W.M. Electronics Corporation” was seriously misleading because of omitted periods in 
debtor’s name); Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, L.L.C., 263 Ga. App. 
649, 588 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that identification of debtor as “Net work 
Solutions, Inc.” instead of “Network Solutions, Inc.” was seriously misleading because of space 
inserted in the word “Network”). Although the secured party lost on the perfection issue, there 
were issues of material fact about whether a buyer of the collateral had actual knowledge of the 
security interest such that the secured party would have priority over the buyer under TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.317 (West 2011). See CNH Capital Am., 2012 WL 5305697, at *6. 
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certificate of title.192 The court held that the financing statement cases were 
inapposite because they dealt with the requirements for naming a debtor and 
not with naming a secured party.193 
B.  PRIORITIES 
Marathon Machine Tools, Inc. v. Davis-Lynch, Inc. involved an interesting 
priority dispute arising in an odd factual setting.194 In Marathon, several 
dishonest employees used funds stolen from their employer to set up and 
operate their own company. The company used some of the stolen funds to 
make a down payment for the purchase of equipment and granted the seller a 
purchase money security interest (PMSI) in the equipment to secure the balance 
of the purchase price. When the employer discovered the theft, it sued the 
company and the employees in federal court, which temporarily enjoined the 
company and the employees from disposing of any money or property that could 
be traced to the stolen funds. When the secured seller learned about the suit, it 
filed a financing statement to perfect its PMSI but did not intervene in the 
federal litigation. A few months later, the federal court entered a judgment 
ordering that all assets of the company, including the equipment, be transferred 
to the employer. At this point, the seller sued the company in state court on the 
ground that the PMSI gave the seller a superior interest in the purchased 
equipment. The court saw the issue as one of priority between an employer who 
had a constructive trust on equipment purchased with stolen funds and a seller 
holding a perfected PMSI. The court held that the constructive trust gave the 
employer lien creditor rights that arose before the seller’s PMSI was perfected.195 
Under § 9.317 of the Code, a creditor who acquires a lien before a security 
interest is perfected has priority even if the security interest is later perfected.196 
Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the employer.197 The lesson of 
Marathon is simple: there is no good reason to delay filing to perfect a security 
interest. 
C.  REPOSSESSION OF COLLATERAL 
The intersection between Chapter 9 of the Code and the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code can be dangerous for a secured creditor, as illustrated by the 
decision in In re Burrell, where a secured party repossessed a car following a 
debtor’s default.198 The debtor filed for bankruptcy a few weeks later. Two days 
 
 192. In re Hoffman, No. 11-43848, 2013 WL 3070437, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. July 30, 2012) 
(mem. op.). 
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 195. Id. at 136–38. 
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after the bankruptcy filing, the debtor’s attorney sent a letter demanding return 
of the car. The secured party refused, contending that it had sold the car at a 
foreclosure sale the day before the debtor filed her bankruptcy petition.199 The 
bankruptcy court found that the creditor did sell the car, but had backdated the 
bill of sale instead of returning the vehicle.200 Because no sale had actually taken 
place before the filing, the debtor still had a right to redeem the vehicle on the 
date of bankruptcy, and the car was therefore part of the bankruptcy estate.201 
The court held that the secured party had violated the automatic stay by failing 
to return the vehicle and that the violation was “egregious.”202 Judgment against 
the secured party for both actual and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees 
was affirmed.203 
D.  DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL FOLLOWING DEFAULT 
If collateral has been successfully repossessed, a secured party may have the 
option of retaining the collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the debt, or 
selling it at public or private sale.204 If the secured party decides to sell the 
collateral, Chapter 9 of the Code contains several sections dealing with the 
giving of notice and accounting for the proceeds of sale.205 Under § 9.610, a sale 
must be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.206 In Foley v. Capital 
One Bank, the debtor challenged the commercial reasonableness of a sale.207 The 
court correctly held that once this issue is raised, the secured party has the 
burden of proving commercial reasonableness.208 On this issue, the court 
determined that the secured party failed to carry the burden and denied recovery 
of a deficiency.209 The decision in Foley is significant because of the court’s 
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ruling that allocating the burden of proof to the secured party following a 
specific denial by the debtor applies to both commercial and to consumer 
cases.210 This resolves an issue that § 9.626(b) expressly left open for court 
determination.211 The result in Foley should be contrasted with an incorrect 
ruling in People’s United Equipment Finance Corp. v. Seminole-Civil, Inc., where the 
court held that a debtor has the burden of showing that a disposition of 
collateral was not commercially reasonable.212 
In Bergene v. Community Bank of Texas, N.A., a secured party conducted a 
foreclosure sale of two towing vessels.213 The debtor contested the commercial 
reasonableness of the sale. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded 
that the secured party had carried its burden of proving that the sale was 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and that the purchase price of 
the two vessels was reasonable in light of their fair market value.214 The trial 
court judgment allowing recovery of a deficiency was affirmed.215 
In In re Adobe Trucking, Inc., the secured party conducted a foreclosure sale of 
oil field equipment in Texas.216 However, the security agreement provided that 
the transaction would be governed by New York law. Referring to the provisions 
of the New York enactment of the Code (which are the same as the Texas 
enactment), the court held that the sale was commercially reasonable and 
affirmed judgment in favor of the secured party.217 
Chapter 9 of the Code includes certain transactions that are not situations in 
which personal property is used as collateral for a loan. Notable among these 
situations is the outright sale of chattel paper.218 In such cases, it is not 
uncommon for the purchaser to purchase the chattel paper with a right of 
recourse against the seller if an account debtor fails to make payments. If the 
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seller fails to repurchase the chattel paper, the purchaser is entitled to foreclose 
and sell the underlying collateral. However, unlike the ordinary secured 
transaction, § 9.601 of the Code relieves the purchaser from the need to give 
notice of sale to the seller of the chattel paper.219 Thus, in Tex Star Motors, Inc. v. 
Regal Finance Co., the court held that while the secured party was required to 
conduct sales of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, it was not 
required to give the seller of the chattel paper any prior notice of the sales.220 
The secured party was, therefore, entitled to recover a deficiency, but the case 
was remanded for the trial court to determine prejudgment interest and whether 
funds held in a reserve account should be used to offset the amount of the 
deficiency.221 
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